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Child Sexual Abuse: Family Problem or Crime?
INTRODUCTION
Children cannot survive without adult care and protection.
Adults do not always provide adequate care and protection to chil-
dren however. Each state has, therefore, developed laws which re-
late to child protection, mandate reporting of abuse, and establish
systems to investigate and treat problems of abuse and neglect
within the family. These laws are a reflection of the state's compel-
ling interest in the welfare of its children.
Awareness of child maltreatment has increased with the public-
ity of horrendous forms of abuse perpetrated against children by
the persons responsible for their care. News stories about fatal
beatings, ritualistic sexual abuse, or gross deprivation of children
arouse outrage against the perpetrators, and against the systems
designed to offer protection when caretakers fail to do so. This out-
rage is a reflection of the community's compelling interest in the
welfare of its children.
The United State Advisory Board on Child Abuse and Neglect
reports that child abuse and neglect represent a national emer-
gency.' Pennsylvania has seen an increase in child abuse reports
from 13,703 in 1981 to 23,861 in 1991 with 4,689 being substanti-
ated in 19812 and 7,986 in 1991.' The greatest increase in reports
made, and reports substantiated, is in regard to sexual abuse. In
1981, 1,547 sexual injuries were reported;" in 1991, that number
had risen to 6,351.6 Certainly, the great majority of these cases
1. Dept of Health and Human Services, Child Abuse and Neglect: Critical First
Steps in Response to a National Emergency, Publication No 017-092-00104-5 at 1 (US
Govt Printing Office, August 1990).
2. Pa Dept of Public Welfare, Office of Children, Youth, and Families, Child Abuse
Report 3 (Pa Dept of Public Welfare, 1981).
3. Pa Dept of Public Welfare, Office of Children, Youth, and Families, Child Abuse
Report 10 (Pa Dept of Public Welfare, 1991).
4. Id.
5. Id. In 1991, 75.9 percent of sexually abused children were girls and 24.1 percent
were boys. Id. 643 of the sexual abuse injuries were inflicted by perpetrators identified as
female and 2100 sexual abuse injuries were inflicted by perpetrators identified as male. Id.
Because the greatest percentage of cases reported involved female victims and male per-
petrators, throughout this paper the author will refer to that type of situation. This paper is
in no way intended to be limited to that particular relationship.
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were not publicized so as to arouse community outrage. But, do
those children, who are so misused and betrayed by their caretak-
ers, warrant any less the interest of a concerned community? The
question is whether abuse and neglect of children are to be classi-
fied primarily as a "family problem" or as a "crime?"
Most parents experience frustration with their children. We do
not want to prosecute and punish someone for doing something we
ourselves might have done or thought of doing. The more severe
the result, however, the more we disassociate ourselves from the
behavior and redefine it as criminal. Significantly, response by gov-
ernmental agencies is defined by this societal attitude. This paper
looks at the management of child abuse by legal systems in
Pennsylvania.
PENNSYLVANIA APPROACH
As in many other states, Pennsylvania's statutes [to combat child abuse]
contain relevant criminal offenses. However, Pennsylvania was one of the
first states in the country to adopt a non-criminal approach to child abuse
prevention ... [t]he law presumed that many, if not most, of these [intra-
familial] relationships could be salvaged without resort to the criminal jus-
tice system and all its stagnitizing repercussions .... I
This non-criminal approach was taken in Pennsylvania with a
view toward encouraging reporting of suspicions of child abuse by
persons outside the family. It was also adopted because of the be-
lief in the early 1970s that attempts at criminal prosecutions would
not be successful due to the reluctance or inability of children and
family members to testify.
7
Noting significant increases in the number of reports, severity of
reports, and reports of repeated abuse, the Pennsylvania District
Attorneys Association argued in 1979 for a change in the laws on
child abuse.8
[T]he theory that child abuse is a "problem" and not a "crime" and should
6. Patrick T. Beatty and Mary R. Woodley, Child Molesters Need Not Apply: A
History of Pennsylvania's Child Protective Services Law and Legislative Efforts to Prevent
the Having of Abusers by Child Care Agencies, 89 Dickinson L Rev 669, 673 (1985). The
original Child Protective Services Law, enacted in 1975, mandated the establishment in all
sixty-seven counties of child protective services to promptly investigate reports of abuse of
children by parents and paramours of parents and to take action to protect children where
necessary. Id. The stated goal was to preserve and stabilize family life wherever appropriate.
Id at 674. Stringent confidentiality safeguards prohibited referral to law enforcement except
in child fatalities. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id at 675.
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be handled through counseling rather than the criminal process is no longer
viable. Reporting provisions which bypass law enforcement authorities are
inadequate to protect both the abused child and other children in the fam-
ily who are potential abuse victims .. . perpetrators of serious, violent
crimes are permitted to continue their abusive behavior.9
Social service practitioners and researchers likewise recognized
that the manner of dealing with abuse as solely a family problem
limited alternatives for case management. Traditional social work
methods involving voluntary agreements between family members
coupled with encouragement by a caseworker to follow through
with counseling or parenting programs are effective if all parties
recognize the problem and are motivated to change. If that motiva-
tion is lacking, child protection agencies can petition the juvenile
court and thereby assure protection from abuse by family members
by placing the victim in substitute care or by securing a court or-
der that parents comply with a plan of treatment. Sanctions by the
juvenile court impact on the victim much more than on the perpe-
trator, however, because it is only the victim who can be removed
from the home, family, and friends, and this removal may not be
the "help" he or she wants or needs.
Disclosure of sexual abuse nearly always places the child in a
more vulnerable position; she will be subjected to great pressure to
recant or deny the allegations.10 Separation of the perpetrator and
the child during initial intervention is essential, but removal of the
offender from the home rather than the victim is more desirable to
protect the child and prevent risk of her being, or feeling, identi-
fied as responsible for the problem. 1
The insidious nature of the child abuse problem, most especially
sexual abuse, warrants stronger alternatives for case management.
Specifically, it warrants alternatives that hold the abuser rather
than the abused accountable. "The traditional CPS (Child Protec-
tive Service) model which uses Juvenile Court to order families to
treatment is ineffective with sexually abusive families because it
does not have the authoritative power of the criminal justice
9. Id.
10. Suzanne Sgroi, M.D., Handbook of Clinical Intervention in Child Sexual Abuse
92 (Lexington Books, 1982).
11. Sgroi, Handbook of Clinical Intervention at 103. This same approach is proposed
by Jon Conte, in his article The Justice System and Sexual Abuse of Children, 58 Social
Services Review 558-67 (December 1984). He believes that removal of the child from the
home can punish her by disrupting her life further and can communicate to her that she is
responsible for the sexual abuse. Id at 565.
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system." 2
Change in the Pennsylvania Child Abuse law was not forthcom-
ing until 1982 when a series of highly publicized cases of child
abuse stimulated the legislature into action. 3 At that time the
Child Protective Services Law was amended to mandate the child
protective services agencies to receive and promptly investigate all
reports of suspected child abuse and to refer reports of homicide,
serious bodily injury, sexual abuse, and abuse by non-caretaker
perpetrators to law enforcement agencies." Under the new law, the
12. Beverly James and Maria Nasjleti, Treating Sexually Abused Children and
Their Families at 24-95 (Consulting Psychologists Press, Inc., 1983).
13. Beatty and Woodley, 89 Dickinson L Rev at 676 (cited in note 6).
14. Child Protective Services Law (CPSL), 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 2215(a)(10) (Pur-
don Supp 1985). The law was recodified in August, 1991 and is now found at CPSL, 23 Pa
Cons Stat Ann §§ 6301 et seq (Purdon 1991). The pertinent sections are as follows:
Section 2. Findings and purpose - abused children are in urgent need of an effective
child protective service to prevent them from suffering further injury and impair-
ment. It is the purpose of this act to encourage more complete reporting of suspected
child abuse and to establish in each county a child protective service capable of inves-
tigating such reports swiftly and competently, providing protection for children from
further abuse and providing rehabilitative services for children and parents involved
so as to ensure the child's well-being and to preserve and stabilize family life wher-
ever appropriate. However, nothing in this act shall be construed to restrict the gen-
erally recognized existing rights of parents to use reasonable supervision and control
when raising their children.
Section 15.Confidentiality of records. - (a) Except as provided in section 14, reports
made pursuant to this act including but not limited to report summaries of child
abuse made pursuant to section 6(b) and written reports made pursuant to section 6
(c) as well as any other information obtained, reports written or photographs or x-
rays taken concerning alleged instances of child abuse in the possession of the depart-
ment, a county children and youth social service agency or a child protective serviced
shall be confidential and shall only be made available to: (among others)
(1) A duly authorized official of a child protective service in the course of his official
duties, multidisciplinary team members assigned to the case, and duly authorized
persons providing services pursuant to section 17(8).
(2) A physician examining or treating a child or the direction or a person specifi-
cally designated in writing by such a director or any hospital or other medical institu-
tion where a child is being treated, where the physician or the director of his designee
suspect the child of being an abused child.
(3) A guardian ad litem for the child.
(4) A duly authorized official or agent of the department in accordance with depart-
ment regulations or in accordance with the conduct of a performance audit as author-
ized by section 20.
(5) A court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to a court order.
(6) A standing committee of the general assembly, as specified in section 24.
(7) The attorney general.
(8) Federal auditors if required for federal financial participation in funding of
agencies provided that federal auditors may not have access to identifiable reports.
(9) Law enforcement officials in the course of investigating cases of (i) homicide,
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civil agency is required to conduct its own investigation but, must
sexual abuse or exploitation, or serious bodily injury as perpetrated by persons
whether related or not related to the victim; (ii) child abuse perpetrated by persons
who are not family members or (iii) repeated physical injury to a child under circum-
stances which indicate that the child's health or welfare is harmed or threatened.
(10) Law enforcement officials who shall receive reports of abuse in which the ini-
tial review gives evidence that the abuse is homicide, sexual abuse or exploitation, or
serious bodily injury perpetrated by persons whether related or not related to the
victim, or child abuse perpetrated by persons who are not family members. Reports
referred to law enforcement officials shall be on such forms provided by and accord-
ing to regulations promulgated by the department. For purposed of section 15 (a)
"serious bodily injury" means bodily injury which creates substantial risk of death or
which causes serious permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of
the function of any bodily member or organ.
(11) County commissioners, to whom the department shall forward specific files
upon request, for review when investigating the competence of county children and
youth employees.
(b) At any time, a subject of a report may receive, upon written request, a copy of
all information except that prohibited from being disclosed by subsection (c) con-
tained in the statewide central register or in any report filed pursuant to section 6.
(c) The release of data that would identify the person who made a report of sus-
pected child abuse or person who cooperated in a subsequent investigation, is hereby
prohibited unless the secretary finds that sch release will not be detrimental to the
safety of such person.
Section 16. Child protective service responsibilities and organization: local plan
(a) unless the department finds it is unfeasible, every county children and youth
social service agency shall establish a "child protective service" within each agency.
The child protective service shall perform those functions assigned by this act to it
and only such others that would further the purpose of this act. It shall have a suffi-
cient staff or sufficient qualifications to fulfill the purposes of this act and organized
in such a way as to maximize the continuity of responsibility, care and services of
individual workers toward individual children and families. The child protective ser-
vice of the county children and youth social service agency shall be the sole civil
agency responsible for receiving and investigating all reports of child abuse made pur-
suant to this act, specifically including, but not limited to reports of child abuse in
facilities operated by the department and other public agencies, for the purpose of
providing protective services to prevent further abuses to children and to provide or
arrange for and monitor the provision of those services necessary to safeguard and
ensure the child's well-being and development, and to preserve and stabilize family
life wherever appropriate; provided,however, that when the suspected child abuse has
been committed by the agency or any of its agents or employees, the department
shall assume the role of the agency with regard to the investigation and directly refer
the child for services. Further, where suspected child abuse has occurred and an em-
ployee or agency of the department or the county children and youth social service
agency or a private or public institution is a subject of the report, the department,
agency or institution shall be informed of the investigation so that it may take appro-
priate action.
(d) Each child protective service shall make available among its services for the
prevention and treatment of child abuse multidisciplinary teams, instruction and ed-
ucation for parenthood,protective and preventive social counseling, emergency care-
taker services, emergency shelter care, emergency medical services, and the establish-
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 31:141
also cooperate with law enforcement. 6
This approach by the Pennsylvania legislature reflects the di-
chotomy of societal attitudes about child abuse by keeping the less
serious abuse in the social service arena and allowing for criminal
prosecution of more extreme cases. In 1982, 1,994 sexual injuries
and 51 fatalities were investigated by Child Protective Services.16
The change in the law requiring referral to law enforcement be-
came effective that year and 703 referrals were made to law en-
forcement;' 4,043 referrals were made to law enforcement in
198311 and 8,077 in 1991.19 Thus, as a result of the new law, those
alleged seriously abused children are afforded protections of both
the civil and criminal justice systems in Pennsylvania.
DIFFICULTIES IN MANAGEMENT: ATTEMPTS TO REMEDY
Various considerations related to the ability of the victim to par-
ticipate in the protection process require recognition by social ser-
vice and law enforcement personnel if intervention is to be effec-
tive. For example, a child who has been betrayed by a trusted
caretaker is expected to cooperate and talk freely with a variety of
strangers in a variety of settings.
The demands of the social services and criminal justice system often mean
that a child victim of a sexual assault may be interviewed about the assault
as many as a dozen times - by a social services investigator, the police, the
ment of groups organized by former abusing parents to encourage self-reporting and
self-treatment of present abusers.
Section 17. Duties of the child protective services:
(11) Provide or arrange for and monitor rehabilitative services for children and
their families on a voluntary basis or under a final or intermediate order of court.
(12) The child protective service shall be as equally vigilant of the status, well-
being, and conditions under which a child is living and being maintained in a facility
other than that of his parent, custodian or guardian from which he has been removed,
as he is of the conditions in the dwelling of the parent, custodian or guardian. Where
the child protective service finds that the placement for any temporary or permanent
custody, care or treatment is for any reason inappropriate or harmful in any way to
the child's physical or mental well-being, it shall take immediate steps to remedy
these conditions including petitioning the court.
23 Pa Cons Stat Ann §§ 6301 et seq.
15. Id.
16. Pa Dept of Public Welfare, Office of Children, Youth and Families, Child Abuse
Report 3 (Pa Dept of Public Welfare, 1982).
17. 'Id.
18. Pa Dept of Public Welfare, Office of Children, Youth, and Families, Child Abuse
Report 17 (Pa Dept of Public Welfare, 1983).
19. Pa Dept of Public Welfare, Office of Children, Youth, and Families, Child Abuse
Report 15 (Pa Dept of Public Welfare, 1991).
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local prosecutor's office, therapists, and many others. This would be a great
strain on any adult, let alone a child already under extreme stress. 0
The difficulty with this expectation of cooperation with multiple
interviews is that the victim may be feeling rejected by friends and
family and fearful of consequences threatened by her perpetrator if
the secret was revealed. She may be feeling great pressure from all
the adults who are trying to help her. Moreover, a delay of one full
year from disclosure to criminal disposition is not unusual, and
this is a very long time in the life of a child.
Efforts to reduce the stress of the intervention process on the
victim are necessary in order to effectively deal with the problem
of child abuse.
Legislators have acted to confront the problem and to aid chil-
dren through the criminal process. The various legislative enact-
ments include: special hearsay exceptions, closed-circuit television
testimony, courtroom closure, speedy disposition, use of anatomi-
cally correct dolls, child considered competent to testify without
prior qualification.2
Coordinated multidisciplinary efforts at investigation and treat-
ment are believed to be necessary for successful prosecution of
child abuse. Communities across the country have developed a va-
riety of programs to improve their response to child abuse by as-
20. National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, Selected State Legislation,
A Guide for Effective State Laws to Protect Children 14 (US Dept of Justice, January
1985).
21. National Center of Prosecution of Child Abuse, Investigation and Prosecution of
Child Abuse ch VII 1-16 (American Prosecutors Research Institute 1987). A breakdown of
states with these enactments is as follows:








with involved agencies 30
Alabama, California and Minnesota have the greatest number of legislative provisions to
aid child victims in prosecutions. Pennsylvania legislation has included all but speedy dispo-
sition and courtroom closure. Id at ch VII 1-16.
See also, National Institute of Justice, When the Victim is a Child 65-82 (National Institute
of Justice, March 1992).
As of December 1988, 26 states have enacted statutes relating to special hearsay; 36 states
allow videotaped testimony, 29 allow closed-circuit testimony, and 33 enacted statutes al-
lowing presumption of competency. Id at 49.
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sisting victims while holding offenders accountable.2 Although this
is not legislated in Pennsylvania, county Child Protective Service
agencies are mandated to cooperate with law enforcement agencies
and, at the county level, agencies develop protocols with local law
enforcement agencies to coordinate initial joint interviews of child
victims. Training programs for investigators, designation of spe-
cialized child abuse prosecution teams, and specialized counseling
programs for victims and offenders have developed across the
state. Similarly, community efforts at education, identification and
prevention have increased.
Neither the victim, the offender, the family, the next generation of children
in that family, nor the well-being of society as a whole can benefit from
continuing secrecy and denial of ongoing sexual abuse. The offender who
protects an uneasy position of power over the silent victims will not release
his control unless he is confronted by an outside power sufficient to demand
and to supervise a total cessation of sexual harassment.
The counselor alone cannot expect cooperation and recovery in an otherwise
reluctant and unacknowledged offender. The justice system alone can rarely
prove guilt or impose sanctions without preparation and continuing support
of all parties within an effective treatment system. All agencies working as a
team give maximum promise of effective recovery for the victim, rehabilita-
tion of the offender and survival of the family.2 3
THE RESPONSE OF PENNSYLVANIA COURTS
As the foregoing indicates, Child Protective Service agencies, law
enforcement agencies, clinicians, and communities have begun to
coordinate efforts to combat child abuse. Legislators have acted to
confront the problem and to aid children through the criminal pro-
cess. Pennsylvania has mobilized to deal with serious child abuse
as both a family problem and a criminal justice problem. Unfortu-
nately, the Pennsylvania courts have not joined in that effort. Re-
cent decisions indicate that from the perspective of our appellate
courts, child abuse is to remain classified as a family problem. By
denying considerations to protections of a child victim in the crim-
22. National Center of Prosecution of Child Abuse, Investigation and Prosecution of
Child Abuse ch VII 1-16 (American Prosecutors Research Institute 1987). Eleven programs
are described from the following states: California, Texas, Florida, Illinois, Alabama, Colo-
rado, New York, Hawaii, Virginia, Oregon, and Georgia. Although they vary somewhat in
methodology, protocols all involve efforts at joint interviewing by CPS and law enforcement
to limit the number of interviews of a child, regular staffing by agency personnel, and refer-
ral for treatment. Id at ch VII 1.
23. Roland Summit, M.D., The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome,
Child Abuse and Neglect, 177-92 (Pergamon Press Ltd, 1983).
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inal prosecution of her offender, our courts limit state protection to
the social service approach.
TESTIMONY
Due to the intimidating -and stressful aspects of testifying in
open court in front of the perpetrator, juvenile court cases exclude
the public and sometimes allow the child to testify in the judge's
chambers. A number of states have even enacted legislation which
allows for alternatives for taking testimony in criminal court by
using videotape or closed circuit television.2'
In examining the constitutionality of such legislation, the United
States Supreme Court in Maryland v Craig25 held that a state's
'interest in the physical and psychological well-being of child abuse
victims may at times be important enough to outweigh a defend-
ant's right to face his accusers in the courtroom.2" In those such
cases, the Court held testimony by closed circuit television was au-
thorized.27 The Court recognized "that states have a compelling in-
terest in protecting minor victims of sex crimes from further
trauma and embarrassment and [t]hat a significant majority of
states has enacted statutes to protect child witnesses from the
trauma of giving testimony in child abuse cases attests to the wide-
spread belief in the importance of such a public policy." 8
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, declined that pro-
tection to children, holding in Commonwealth v Ludwig ' that the
Confrontation Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution does not
24. Josephine A. Buckley, Evidentiary and Procedural Trends in State Legislation
and Other Emerging Legal Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 89 Dickinson L Rev 645,
657 (1985).
25. 497 US 836, 110 S Ct 3157 (1990).
26. Craig, 110 S Ct at 3168.
27. Id at 3167.
28. Id.
29. 527 Pa 472, 594 A2d 281 (1991). In the case, Ludwig was charged with various
sexual offenses against his five year old daughter. Ludwig, 594 A2d at 282. Because the child
had undergone "emotional freezing" at the preliminary hearing and her therapist testified
that psychological progress she was making subsequent to that event would be impaired if
the child had to testify in front of her father, the trial court allowed the child to testify by
closed-circuit television. Id at 281. The procedure balanced the welfare of the child against
the appellant's right to confrontation. Id. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's deci-
sion, focusing on the language of Pennsylvania's Constitution, Article I, Section 9, ensuring
the right of the defendant to meet witnesses "face to face." Id at 282. The court distin-
guished the United States Supreme Court decision in Craig by stating that, unlike the
United States Constitution which reflects a "preference" for face to face confrontations, the
Pennsylvania Constitution "clearly, emphatically, and unambiguously requires a 'face to
face' confrontation." Ludwig, 594 A2d at 284.
1992
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permit the infringement of a defendant's constitutional right to
meet a witness face to face.30 The Ludwig court stated that "[wie
are cognizant of society's interest in protecting victims of sexual
abuse. However, that interest cannot be preeminent over the ac-
cused's constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him
face to face."3 "
Justice Nix dissented, calling the majority opinion a demonstra-
bly incorrect attempt to latch onto stylistic differences between the
Federal and Pennsylvania Constitutions when the substantive
right protected was identical. 32 Justice Flaherty also dissented,
stating that the right to face to face confrontation was not absolute
and that the decision could be "a virtual license for any miscreant
to abuse very young children who, predictably, will be unable to
accuse the criminal to his face."3 3 Justice Flaherty called attention
to "[t]he now well- documented, widespread incidence of perverted
adults preying upon defenseless children [that] has caused a need
to provide realistic protection for children in our society." '34
In 1986, Pennsylvania's General Assembly enacted a statute au-
thorizing the use of closed-circuit television testimony once good
cause was shown.3 5 The express declaration of policy behind this
statute is "to promote the best interests of children . . . [and] to
provide children with additional rights and protections during
their involvement with the criminal justice system.
'3 6
Although the decision in Ludwig did not specifically address the
constitutionality of the video-taping statute, the ruling in that case
effectively makes the use of this procedure to aid child witnesses a
violation of a defendant's constitutional right to confrontation.
Pennsylvania courts have, therefore, held form over substance in
this area of protection of children by a literal interpretation of the
Constitution. The state's interest in the physical and psychological
well-being of child abuse victims is not sufficiently important to
outweigh a defendant's right to face his accuser in a direct face to
face manner. In Pennsylvania, victims of abuse must face their
30. Id.
31. Id at 285.
32. Id.
33. Id at 289.
34. Id at 290.
35. Child, Victims and Witnesses Act, 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 5985(a) (Purdon 1992).
This statute was enacted after the trial in Ludwig and was in effect at the time of the
Supreme Court decision. The Court acknowledged the statute in a footnote and stated that
its constitutionality was not at issue. Ludwig, 594 A2d at 282.
36. 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 5981 (Purdon 1992).
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abuser in open court, even though his confrontation rights can be
protected in ways that will lessen additional trauma to the young
victim, such as the closed-circuit television testimony authorized
by the United States Supreme Court.
The only resolution to the position taken by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court is in a constitutional amendment. Senator Steven
Greenleaf (R-Montgomery County) has sponsored Senate Bill
111511 to start the process of amending Pennsylvania's Constitu-
tion in response to the Ludwig case. The "face to face" require-
ment of Article I, Section 9 would instead read, as does the United
States Constitution, "be confronted with the witnesses against
him" so that use of videotaped depositions or closed- circuit televi-
sion testimony would be allowable.
Fortunately, the Pennsylvania State legislature does not intend
to see child protection efforts frustrated by holding children to
adult standards in criminal courts.
PRIVACY
The Pennsylvania courts have further minimized protections to
children in the criminal court setting by eroding protections of the
Rape Shield Law. Pennsylvania's Rape Shield Law is designed to
provide certain protections to victims of sexual abuse by excluding
evidence of chastity or promiscuity so as not to distract from the
legitimate issues involved in a sexual abuse prosecution.38 Few ex-
ceptions to this protection have been allowed. These exceptions
are: (1) inquiries regarding relevant evidence which would tend to
disprove the allegation; (2) opportunity to provide alternative ex-
37. Joint Resolution, S 1115, Session of 1991, as Amended January 28, 1992.
38. Evidence of Victims Sexual Conduct Act, 18 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 3104 (Purdon
1983).
§ 3104. Evidence of victim's sexual conduct:
(a) General rule. - Evidence of specific instances of the alleged victim's past sexual
conduct, opinion evidence of the alleged victim's past sexual conduct, and reputation
evidence of the alleged victim's past sexual conduct shall not be admissible in prose-
cutions under this chapter except evidence of the alleged victim's past sexual conduct
with the defendant where consent of the alleged victim is at issue and such evidence
is otherwise admissible pursuant to the rules of evidence.
(b) Evidentiary proceedings. - A defendant who proposes to offer evidence of the al-
leged victim's past sexual conduct pursuant to subsection (a) shall file a written mo-
tion and offer of proof at the time of trial. If, at the time of trial, the court determines
that the motion and offer of proof are sufficient on their faces, the court shall order
an in camera hearing and shall make findings on the record as to the relevance and




planation for physical evidence; and (3) opportunity to demon-
strate specific motive for complainant to bring false charges. 9 For
an exception to be allowed, an adequate specific proffer must be
made and found to be relevant, more probative than prejudicial,
and not merely cumulative of other unprivileged impeachment or
rebutted evidence.40 There is "no authority for . . . 'fishing expedi-
tion' style intrusions on Rape Shield law protections ...."
In a recent case, Commonwealth v Wall 42, the Pennsylvania Su-
perior Court found a proffer sufficiently specific when presented
with uncontested evidence that a twelve year old victim had prior
experience as a prosecutrix in a sexual assault case.43 That case
had resulted in the child's removal from her home and placement
with an aunt who harshly disciplined her. The defense contended
that the aunt's discipline may have prompted the child to fabricate
a claim of sexual abuse against her uncle in order to be removed
from that home.
44
Evidence of specific hostility toward a defendant has been con-
sidered relevant, and therefore admissible, but in Wall, evidence of
hostility toward a third party was authorized. It was deemed rele-
vant because the defense laid a foundation to show that the vic-
tim's peculiar knowledge of the content, and potential conse-
quences of a sexual abuse claim, may establish why the victim
might have fabricated a claim against an adult male in a home she
may want to leave.' 5
The Wall court held that, although "the mere fact that a com-
plainant was previously victimized is itself wholly irrelevant,...
where ... otherwise admissible facts render evidence of previous
participation in a materially similar prior prosecution genuinely
exculpatory, such facts may not be excluded from trial."" Here,
the otherwise admissible facts included evidence of the child's fear
of physical punishment by her aunt, the timing of her allegations
of sexual abuse as immediately following a violent argument with
her aunt, and an unsuccessful attempt on her part to seek police
protection from her aunt.4
7
39. Commonwealth v Nieves, 399 Pa Super 277, 582 A2d 341, 347 (1990).
40. Nieves, 582 A2d at 347.
41. Id at 349.
42. - Pa Super -, 606 A2d 449 (1992).
43. Wall, 606 A2d at 454.
44. Id at 458.
45. Id at 462.
46. Id at 466.
47. Id at 461.
Vol. 31:141
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In Wall, the child testified that she had engaged in a variety of
sexual acts with her uncle in exchange for protection from her
aunt's severe discipline."' The Wall court reasoned that the vic-
tim's prior history of sexual abuse should have been admitted to
allow the defense to establish that the victim may have fabricated
a claim of sexual abuse against her uncle instead of claiming physi-
cal abuse by her aunt in order to be removed from that home.'9
The difficulty in this reasoning is that in prior cases in Pennsylva-
nia, the fact that a victim stated she had been previously raped50
or had made repeated and unbelievable claims of sexual attacks by
others,51 or that a child learned nomenclature and sexual tech-
niques from a prior sexual assault5" was found not to be an ade-
quate basis to serve as an exception to the Rape Shield Law.
Rather, evidence has only been admitted when it tended to prove
that the victim might have fabricated the sexual abuse claim
against the defendant by a showing of witness bias and hostility
toward the defendant, and a motive to seek retribution against
him.5
48. Id at 452.
49. Id at 462.
50. Commonwealth v Troy, 381 Pa Super 326, 553 A2d 992, 997 (1989). The defend-
ant wanted to attack the victim's credibility by introducing evidence that she had been
raped previously. Troy, 553 A2d at 997. That was disallowed based on the Rape Shield Law
because defense of consent was not made. Id at 997.
51. Commonwealth v Coia, 342 Pa Super 358, 492 A2d 1159, 1161 (1985). In Coia
defendant was convicted of sexual offenses against a fifteen year old. Coia, 492 A2d at 1160.
He was to introduce evidence that the victim had made repeated and unbelievable claims of
sexual attacks upon herself by others in the past. Id. The evidence was precluded as irrele-
vant, prohibited by the Rape Shield Law, not exculpatory, and unnecessarily prejudicial to
the victim because unproven. Id at 1161.
52. Commonwealth v Appenzeller, 388 Pa Super 172, 565 A2d 170, 171 (1989). Ap-
penzeller was convicted of sexual offenses against a three year old neighbor child. Appen-
zeller, 565 A2d at 171. He appealed arguing he should have been allowed to question the
victim and her mother about a prior sexual assault of the victim to show a source for her
knowledge of sexual activity. Id at 171. The court held that the evidence was irrelevant to
appellant's defense because the child's credibility was never under attack as to the identifi-
cation of her attacker. Id. "A child no less than an adult is protected from having her prior
sexual history paraded in public and having unfair inferences drawn by a jury therefrom.
This is particularly true where, as here, the prior history involved another assault." Id at
172.
53. Commonwealth v Black, 337 Pa Super 548, 487 A2d 396, 399 (1985). Black ap-
pealed his conviction of sexual offenses against his thirteen year old daughter claiming that
the Rape Shield Law was applied to exclude evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct
with her brother which would have showed her bias toward him. Black, 487 A2d at 398.
Black claimed that the child made the allegations after a violent argument between he and
the victim's brother which resulted in the brother leaving the home. Id. Further, Black al-
leged that because she had an on-going sexual relationship with her brother, she was angry
at her father for this and wanted him out of the home so the brother could return. Id. The
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 31:141
For example, in Commonwealth v Smith,5 the court excluded
evidence of the past sexual history of the victim which had been
offered for a general attack on the victim's credibility, stating that
"the holding in Black ... should be viewed quite narrowly as later
cases have applied it only where the victim's credibility was alleg-
edly affected by bias against or hostility toward the defendant, or
the victim had a motive to seek retribution.""s The Smith court
found no such evidence. 6 Further, the court noted that the de-
fendant had ample alternative means to attack the victim's credi-
bility and therefore, application of the Rape Shield Law in order to
exclude the evidence of prior sexual acts was appropriate.,
The Wall court had allowed prior sexual history to be intro-
duced into evidence to show that bias and hostility against a third
party might have been the basis of a fabrication against a defend-
ant while acknowledging that other evidence was available to chal-
lenge the credibility of the victim.58 Because the victim's testimony
was uncorroborated and the evidence of past sexual history was an
"undisputed matter of record," the Wall court distinguished this
case from Commonwealth v Johnson 9 where evidence of past sex-
ual history of a child was excluded because the possibility of
Court admitted the evidence because it was offered to show specific bias against and hostil-
ity toward appellant and motive to seek retribution by, perhaps, false accusations. Id at 399.
The Court stressed, however, that not all material evidence is necessarily admissible and
even when logically relevant "the victim's prejudice or lack of credibility may be excluded if
'it would so inflame the minds of the jurors that its probative value is outweighed by unfair
prejudice.'" Id at 401.
54. - Pa Super - , 599 A2d 1340 (1991). The defense theory in Smith was that
the thirteen year old victim accused the defendant of rape only to avoid her grandmother's
possible anger upon learning that she had had sexual intercourse with someone. Smith, 599
A2d at 1343. No evidence of fear of the grandmother's reaction was presented to the extent
the victim would allege rape. Id. A rape test had been done and showed evidence of recent
sexual activity but the victim, although she had the opportunity to name the defendant as
the perpetrator, did not do so, and this was more indicative of a lack of bias toward him. Id
at 1344.
55. Id (emphasis in original), quoting Commonwealth v Boyles, 407 Pa Super 343,
595 A2d 1180 (1991).
56. Smith, 599 A2d at 1344.
57. Id.
58. Wall, 606 A2d at 463.
59. 389 Pa Super 184, 566 A2d 1197 (1989). The defense wanted to impeach the testi-
mony of an eyewitness claiming that he was the actual perpetrator and had intimidated the
victim to blame the defendant. Johnson, 566 A2d at 1201. The Court said that "where the
proposed testimony is lacking in bias, hostility or motive to seek retribution against the
defendant by victim it has been held to be inadmissible." Id at 1200. The Court concluded
that the Rape Shield Law was a bar to admissibility of testimony of prior sexual conduct of
the victim unless it has probative value which is exculpatory to the defendant. Id at 1202.
Comments
prejudice outweighed the probative value.60
Justice Olzewski dissented in Wall stating his belief that evi-
dence of the child's previous victimization by her mother's par-
amour was irrelevant.
It is difficult enough for victims of sexual assault to relive the traumatic
events of the assault which is being prosecuted[.] [T]o force a victim to re-
count an assault for which a separate perpetrator has already been tried and
convicted would discourage serial victims from bringing forth allegations.
Therefore, the decision rendered in Wall allows evidence of a
child's removal from an abusive home to be used to try to establish
why the victim might fabricate a specific type of allegation against
a subsequent caretaker or other household member when she is al-
leging further abuse in substitute care. The problem with this deci-
sion is that, abused children are abused in substitute care settings.
In 1991, there were 257 substantiated reports of child abuse in sub-
stitute care settings (these involved children placed by juvenile
court in agency approved settings); 184 of these cases involved sex-
ual abuse.
62
Certainly evidence of probative value which is exculpatory to the
defendant must be admitted to comply with due process guaran-
tees. Other state courts have acknowledged a due process exception
to their rape shield statutes, or have created new exceptions. 3 In
Washington, the court does not apply its rape shield statute to
prior sexual abuse of a victim, but only to evidence of prior sexual
activity or misconduct of a victim.
6 4
In New Jersey, an exception to the rape shield statute provides
for introduction of evidence of an alternative source for an infant's
sexual knowledge, but, such evidence is limited to that knowledge,
60. Id.
61. Wall, 606 A2d at 467.
62. Pa Dept of Public Welfare, Office of Children, Youth and Families, Child Abuse
Report 15 (Pa Dept of Public Welfare, 1991).
63. Comment, Rape Shield Statutes: Constitutional Despite Unconstitutional Ex-
clusions of Evidence, 1985 Wis L Rev 1219, 1270. New Hampshire, Minnesota, Louisiana,
Nevada and Ohio acknowledge due process exceptions while Michigan and Wisconsin along
with Pennsylvania have created exceptions. Id.
64. State v Markle, 118 Wash 2d 424, 823 P2d 1101, 1109 (1992). The defense at-
tempted to establish that the child had a motive to fabricate allegations of sexual abuse
against the defendant by arguing that she had been abused by his son, and that she was
angry because he had not responded to her complaints to him about that. Markle, 823 P2d
at 1103. The evidence of the son's prior abuse was excluded, not by the rape shield protec-
tion, but because of the defendant's inability to establish a motive for fabrication, despite
having several opportunities to make a satisfactory offer of proof. Id at 1108.
1992
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and cannot be considered to attack character or credibility- 5
In its analysis of that issue, the New Jersey Supreme Court
noted that
[t]he majority of out-of-state courts agree that the prior sexual abuse of a
youthful victim is relevant to rebut the inference that the complainant
could not describe the details of sexual intercourse if the defendant had not
committed the acts in question."
65. State v Budis, 125 NJ 519, 593 A2d 784, 794 (1991). Budis was convicted of ag-
gravated sexual assault of his cousin's nine year old daughter. Budis, 593 A2d at 786. On
appeal the conviction was reversed. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed that decision.
Id. The trial court had prohibited testimony about details about the victim's sexual abuse
by her step father, relying on the rape shield statute. Id at 787. Limited cross examination
about the allegations and the investigation was allowed, but not about the circumstances or
nature of the abuse by the stepfather. Id. The supreme court held that the probative value
of that evidence as an alternative source for the child's sexual knowledge outweighed its
possible prejudicial effect. Id at 788. The court reasoned that consistent with policies of
protecting victims and preserving integrity of trials, the statue limits exceptions to admis-
sion of evidence of a victim's previous sexual conduct and prescribes the circumstances
under which the trial court may consider the evidence to be relevant. Id. The defendant
here argued that by restricting the purposes for which the evidence may be admitted, the
statute deprives him of a defense. Id. The court stated that the probative value of prior acts
depends on clear proof that they occurred; that they are relative to a material issue; and
that they are necessary to a defense; and when offered to show a child's knowledge of sexual
acts, relevance depends on whether the prior abuse closely resembles the acts in question. Id
at 790. The court said that the likely trauma to the child and the degree to which admission
of the evidence will invade the child's privacy must be considered in assessing the prejudi-
cial effect of such evidence. Id. Prejudice may be diminished if evidence can be adduced
from sources other than the child, such as official documents involving conviction or by
stipulation. Id at 791. The proper balance of relevance and prejudicial effect depends on the
facts of each case and varies considerably with the age of the victim. Id. The court held the
evidence of this child's prior abuse relevant because the crux of the defense is not that the
child fabricated, but that she initiated the acts and evidence of an alternative source of her
sexual knowledge is crucial. Id. The court said that the trial court should deliver an instruc-
tion on the limited purpose of the evidence and expressly instruct the jury that it may not
consider the evidence as an attack on the child's character or impeachment of her credibil-
ity. Id at 794. The instruction must indicate that the relevance of prior sexual history is
limited to the victim's knowledge of sexual acts. Id. In his dissent, Judge O'Hern stated:
[i]n the vast majority of cases involving adult victims in which consent may be con-
sidered to be critical to the defense, the evidence sought to be introduced here would
be totally inadmissible. Evidently, because of an assumption that children are naive
or innocent, the majority believes that we must counteract that assumption by per-
mitting the very indignities to be inflicted on this child victim that we would not
inflict on an adult victim.
Id.
66. Id at 791 citing State v Oliver, 158 Ariz 22, 28, 760 P2d 1071, 1077 (1988) (evi-
dence of prior sexual abuse relevant to show ability to fabricate); State v Jacques, 558 A2d
706, 708 (Me 1989) (prior sexual abuse of victim admissible to rebut the inference of child's
inability to describe accurately acts of sexual. intercourse); Commonwealth v Ruffen, 399
Mass 811, 815, 507 NE2d 684, 687 (prior sexual abuse of ten-year-old relevant to show
child's personal knowledge of sexual acts and terminology); Summit v State, 101 Nev 159,
163-64, 697 P2d 1374, 1377 (1985) (evidence of prior sexual abuse relevant to rebut infer-
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In Oregon, evidence of sexual behavior which relates to the mo-
tive or bias of the alleged victim can be admitted. 7 Evidence relat-
ing to the victim's hostility toward the defendant and an accusa-
tion of sexual abuse against another man by the child's friend is
not "sexual behavior," however, and does not come within the ex-
ceptions provided by the rape shield statute.6
In Illinois, the rape shield statute precludes admission of evi-
dence of the sexual history of the victim unless it relates to sexual
conduct with the defendant. 9 When knowledge of sexual activities
becomes an issue, however, due process precludes application of
the rape shield statute."
ence that sexual abuse described by six-year-old complainant must have occurred or she
could not have described it); State v Baker, 127 NH 801, 805, 408 A2d 1059, 1062 (1986)
(due process requires admission of prior sexual experience of youthful victim to show knowl-
edge of sexual acts); People v Ruiz, 71 AD2d 569, 570, 418 NYS2d 402, 403 (1979) (prior
sexual experience of victim admissible to show ability to describe acts of sexual intercourse);
State v Pulizzano, 155 Wis 2d 633, 651-53, 456 NW2d 325, 333 (prior sexual abuse relevant
to show alternative source for sexual knowledge). Budis, 593 A2d at 791.
67. State of Oregon v Wattenberger, 97 Or App 414, 776 P2d 1292, 1295 (1989). De-
fendant was convicted of sexual abuse of the four year old child of his paramour. He ap-
pealed arguing that the trial court erred in failing to conduct an in camera inspection of
Children's Services Division records relating to the victim to determine whether they con-
tained exculpatory evidence. On that basis, the judgment was vacated and the case re-
manded. Wattenberger, 776 P2d at 1292. The defendant also argued that the trial court
erred in denying his motion to introduce evidence of the child's past sexual conduct. Id. He
sought to show that after the alleged incident for which he was accused, the victim was
abused by five other persons; that the victim and her mother were angry with him; and that
within a week of the complaint against him, another child who lived in the home with the
victim accused another man of sexual abuse. Id at 1293. The court concluded that the evi-
dence was not sexual behavior as the term is used in the rape shield statute and, therefore,
was not admissible. Id. The court rejected defendant's argument that the evidence could
establish bias or motive to falsely accuse him. Id at 1294.
68. Id at 1293.
69. People of Illinois v Sandoval, 135 Ill 2d 159, 552 NE2d 726, 732 (1990). Defend-
ant was convicted of "date rape." Sandoval, 552 NE2d at 727. His conviction was reversed
on appeal, but the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appeal court. Id. The issue con-
cerned admissibility of the sexual history of the victim under the state's rape shield statute.
Id. The defendant attempted to introduce evidence that the victim had anal sex with other
men, and that she brought the complaint against him because he had rejected her. Id at 728.
The court reasoned that the evidence of prior sexual practices of the victim sought to be
introduced would not reveal bias, prejudice, or motive to testify falsely. Id at.733.
70. Illinois v Mason, 219 Ill App 3d 76, 578 NE2d 1351, 1353 (1991). Mason was
convicted by a jury trial of aggravated sexual assault of a seven year old female. Mason, 578
NE2d at 1353. Testimony that the child had viewed sexually explicit videotapes and that
she put things into her vagina was prohibited by the trial court on the theory that it was
barred by the Illinois rape shield statute. Id at 1353. On appeal, the court held that the rape
shield law does not apply to the facts in the case. Id. The court reasoned that the rape
shield statute applies to prior sexual activity or reputation but not viewing of pornographic
videotapes. Id. Further, the court held that the policies behind the statute, to prevent har-
assment and humiliation of victims and to encourage victims to report, cannot justify deny-
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Because Pennsylvania courts will allow prior sexual history of a
victim to be admitted to show evidence of bias and hostility, not
only toward a defendant, but also toward a third party as a basis of
theory of fabrication of specific allegations, investigators must be
very thorough in this area. It is to be expected that motive to
fabricate is dealt with in the initial investigative and validity as-
sessment process. Joint interviews by trained interviewers, mul-
tidisciplinary case conferences prior to prosecution, and an ade-
quate preparation of child witnesses are essential to the successful
prosection of child sexual abuse, and the Wall decision holds pro-
fessionals in the field accountable for strict standards in those
areas.
Prosecutors must be aware of the special problems in child abuse
cases. When arguing pretrial motions regarding admissibility of a
victim's prior sexual history, prosecutors must demand specific
proffers of evidence relating to motive to fabricate or alternative
sources of sexual knowledge. In situations when evidence of an
adult victim's sexual history would be precluded, the child victim's
privacy should similarly be protected.
Voir dire questions should be used carefully to both educate ju-
rors about child sexual abuse and to disclose juror bias. It is impor-
tant to ask potential jurors whether: they or any friends or family
members have been accused of abuse; they view the problem as a
family matter beyond governmental intervention; they have diffi-
culty listening to descriptive sexual language; they tend to question
the credibility of young children; and whether they would tend to
disbelieve that a victim was biased against this defendant because
she was previously abused by someone else.
Further, prosecutors must request jury instructions which state
that evidence of prior abuse was allowed to show knowledge but
not to be considered as an attack on character.
Probably nothing is more important, however, than adequate
preparation of the child for testimony. Prosecutors must meet with
ing a defendant the right to refute evidence which tends to establish sexual abuse took
place. Id. The court held that "when knowledge of sexual activities becomes an issue, as in
the present case, the rape shield statute does not apply, and due process precludes its appli-
cation." Id. The Court affirmed the trial court's decision to deny introduction of the Depart-
ment of Child and Family Services (DCFS) regarding a previous accusation by this victim
against the defendant. Id at 1355. The court reasoned that because the decision by DCFS to
unfound the allegations was not a judicial decision that the charges were false, and because
general relevance considerations require the movant to demonstrate that the proffered evi-
dence would prove it more likely than not that the prior accusations were false, the proba-
tive value of that evidence would be slight. Id at 1356.
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the child on several occasions to establish a comfortable rapport.
Discussion of the child's feelings toward the offender is critical in
order to properly explain the criminal process. For example, a
child who loves her offender and does not want to see him go to
jail, needs to be helped to understand that he has a problem and
without assistance from the judge he may hurt other children. If
the child is frightened of the offender, she must be helped to un-
derstand that his power is in the secret and that her telling what
happened eliminates his power. The prosecutor must explain the
process of questioning and cross-examination and anticipate de-
fense questions about motive to fabricate.
Because children take cues from adult behavior, prosecutors
must remain confident and comfortable with the child throughout
the process.
CONFIDENTIALITY
Allegedly the courts will not allow "fishing expeditions" in order
to gather undisputed evidence of past sexual abuse resulting in re-
moval from the home. The Pennsylvania Superior Court, however,
recently rendered a decision which almost routinely gives defend-
ants access to information of that sort which is contained in Child
Protective Service agency files, even though the United States Su-
preme Court has authorized greater protection of those records. In
Pennsylvania v Ritchie,7 the United States Supreme Court stated
71. 480 US 39 (1987). This case involved defendant Ritchie's trial for various sexual
offenses of his daughter. Children and Youth Services had conducted an investigation sepa-
rate from the police investigation as required by the Child Protective Services Law. Ritchie,
480 US at 43. In pretrial discovery Ritchie subpoenaed Child Protective Service files related
to the immediate charges as well as records of a previous report of abuse. Id. The Children
and Youth agency refused to release the records per the confidentiality section of the law
and Ritchie moved for sanctions. Id. He argued that he was entitled to the information
because the file might contain names of favorable witnesses and other unspecified exculpa-
tory evidence. Id at 44. The trial court refused to disclose the Children and Youth Services
files. Id. Ritchie was convicted and appealed arguing that his confrontation rights had been
violated because the Children and Youth Service files had not been disclosed. Id at 45. The
superior court ruled that Ritchie was not entitled to full disclosure but rather the trial court
was to examine the file in camera and release verbatim statements made by the victim to
defendant and full record to defense counsel to allow him to argue relevance of the state-
ments. Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that defense was entitled to review
the entire file to search for any useful evidence. Id at 46. The United States Supreme Court
noted Ritchie's argument that the Children and Youth Services files might contain state-
ments by the victim which were inconsistent with her trial statements or reveal that the girl
acted with improper motive that failure to disclose the Child Protective Services file vio-
lated the Confrontation Clause. Id at 51. The Court did not agree that defendant should be
granted full access to the Children and Youth Services files but found that in camera review
1992
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that "[a] defendant's right to discover exculpatory evidence does
not include the unsupervised authority to search through the Com-
monwealth's files" and found that "Ritchie's interest (as well as
that of the Commonwealth) in ensuring a fair trial can be pro-
tected fully by requiring that the Children and Youth Services files
be submitted only to the trial court for in camera review. T7  The
Court further stated that allowing full disclosure of child abuse
files would frustrate the state's efforts to encourage reporting and
protect victims.
73
Despite this interpretation, which would tend to offer some pro-
tection to child abuse victims by maintaining the confidentiality of
therapy notes and treatment efforts, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court in Commonwealth v Kennedy7' reinterpreted the Child Pro-
tective Services Law to allow full disclosure of Child Protective
Service files to defendants.7 The Court found in camera reviews
by the trial court would protect the interests in ensuring a fair trial. Id. The Court stated
that allowing full disclosure would sacrifice unnecessarily the Commonwealth's compelling
interest in protecting its child abuse information. Id at 60. Due to the difficulty in detecting
and prosecuting child abuse and the particular vulnerability of the victim, the Court said it
is essential that the child have a state-designated person to whom she can turn with assur-
ances of confidentiality. Id. The State's purpose in protecting children and encouraging re-
porting would be frustrated if confidential material had to be disclosed upon demand to a
defendant charged with criminal child abuse, simply because a trial court may not recognize
exculpatory evidence. Id at 61. See note 14 for provisions of the Child Protective Services
Law.
72. Id at 59.
73. Id at 60.
74. __ Pa Super , 604 A2d 1036 (1992). Kennedy appealed his conviction for
sexual offenses against his step-daughter. Kennedy, 604 A2d at 1038. Prior to trial he had
sought discovery of Child Protective Service files and sought review of the record of the
child's counseling sessions. Id. In camera review of all records was conducted by the motions
judge. Nothing material to the defense was found. Id. The trial court also conducted in
camera review and found no information relevant to the defense. Id. The superior court
reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial based, not on a violation of
appellant's constitutional rights, but on the basis of the language of the Child Protective
Services Law. Id at 1039. Reasoning that cases validated by the civil agency may form the
basis of criminal prosecution, the court stated that the information contained in Child Pro-
tective Services files is of critical importance to the accused. Id. The court focused its analy-
sis on the confidentiality provisions of the Child Protective Services Law, specifically 11 Pa
Cons Stat Ann § 2215(b) (see note 14). It distinguished the United States Supreme Court
analysis in Ritchie by stating in a footnote, that Ritchie involved analysis only of subsection
2215(a) (see note 14). While the Child Protective Service agency maintained that § 2215(b)
limits the information provided to a subject of a report who requests it, the Court stated
that the provision entitles a subject requesting all information in the file relative to the
investigation maintained by the local Child Protective Services or by the Department of
Public Welfare (in the Statewide Central Registry) with the exception of the name of the
reporter pursuant to § 2215(c). Kennedy, 604 A2d at 1039. See note 14.
75. Kennedy, 604 A2d at 1039.
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too restrictive.76
In Kennedy, although the investigating agency (Child Protective
Services) informed the court that information of a therapeutic or
rehabilitative nature might be part of one master file related to the
child and family, the court did not deal with that reality. Rather, it
stated that the Child Protective Services could, in fact, be in viola-
tion of the Act if investigation files were not maintained separately
from files related to other agency aspects of case management.
7"
Therapy records not contained in the Child Protective Services file
or which are not in possession of the Commonwealth cannot be
accessed by a defendant based on the absolute privilege of 42 Pa
Cons Stat Ann section 5945.1.7 This statute was created to protect
confidential communications between 'the sexual assault counselor
and the victim.
79
Judge Johnson concurred that therapeutic records not in the
possession of the prosecution need not be released. 0 He dissented,
however, regarding the release of the Child Protective Service files
because he believed that a stepfather did not qualify as a "subject
of a report.""1 He further stated that in camera review of the Child
Protective Service files sufficiently protected defendant's rights
and that the court had "[g]uided by Ritchie ... approved the pro-
cedure . . . in Commonwealth v Higby 2 and Commonwealth v
Dunkle."as
76. Id at 1042.
77. Id at 1041.
78. 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 5945.1 Confidential Communications to Sexual Assault
Counselors:
(b) Privilege
(1) No sexual assault counselor may, without the written consent of the victim, dis-
close the victim's confidential oral or written communications to the counselor nor
consent to be examined in any court or criminal proceeding.
(2) No coparticipant who is present during counseling may disclose a victim's confi-
dential communication made during the counseling session nor consent to be ex-
amined in any civil or criminal proceeding without the written consent of the victim.
As amended 1990, December 17, P L 737, No 183, § 1.
79. Kennedy, 604 A2d at 1045, 1047. The court explained this by referring to the
recent supreme court case Commonwealth v Wilson/Aultman, Pa - , 602 A2d 1290
(1992) which interpreted § 5945.1 as precluding release of any confidential communications
made by the victim and providing rape crisis center clients with the same confidentiality
received by rape victims who seek private psychotherapeutic treatment. Kennedy, 604 A2d
at 1045. The Wilson/Aultman court stated that the statutory privilege provides even greater
protection than did the statute assented in the Ritchie case. Kennedy, 604 A2d at 1046.
80. Id at 1049.
81. Id.
82. 384 Pa Super 619, 559 A2d 939 (1989).
83. 384 Pa Super 317, 561 A2d 5 (1989), rev'd on other grounds, - A2d -
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In Higby, the defendant had been denied his pretrial motion for
discovery of Child Protective Service records.8 4 The trial court had
refused him access upon its finding that the records contained no
material evidence of an exculpatory nature. 85 The superior court
had affirmed the trial court decision, concluding that the trial
court "complied with the law with respect to the Children's Ser-
vices records." 86
In Dunkle, the trial court had, upon defendant's motion for dis-
covery, conducted an in camera review of the Child Protective Ser-
vice records in possession of the Commonwealth.87 It had also pro-
vided the defendant with various statements made by the victim.88
The court had instructed the defendant that if he believed the
records contained other discoverable evidence and presented a col-
orable argument that the material existed, they would be re-
leased.89 The defendant argued that this situation was distinguish-
able from Ritchie because, unlike in Ritchie, the prosecution had
access to the file.90 The superior court rejected this argument as
well as the alternative argument that the victim waived her confi-
dentiality by releasing the records to the Commonwealth.91 The
court stated that "the [defendant] appears to believe that the vic-
tim has no interest in seeing her abuser brought to justice .... [hiis
unsubstantiated argument in this regard is offensive in its obvious
disregard and insensitivity to the victims of sexual abuse and the
difficulty encountered by the Commonwealth in detecting and
prosecuting the offender."92 The court concluded that the trial
court had afforded the defendant all the protections he was enti-
tled to under Ritchie.93
Significantly, these cases are not reconciled in Kennedy; they are
not even mentioned in the majority opinion. The Kennedy deci-
sion changes prior approved practice of in camera review of Child
Protective Service files while authorizing absolute privilege for
therapy records. In fact, however, Child Protective Service records
(1992).
84. Higby, 559 A2d at, 939.
85. Id.
86. Id at 940.
87. Dunkle, 561 A2d at 5.
88. Id.
89. Id at 9.






do contain therapy reports. The Child Protective Service agency is
mandated not just to investigate, but to provide and monitor reha-
bilitative services to family members, and to keep records." Al-
though the court focuses on one specific provision (11 Pa Stat §
2215(b)) in granting full disclosure of the Child Protective Service
file, analysis should focus instead on giving effect to all provisions
of the statute to effectuate legislative intent.'5 Certainly in camera
review of Child Protective Service records accomplishes that while
still satisfying defendant's constitutional rights as seen in Ritchie.
In the absence of compelling reasons to justify more expansive compulsory
discovery rights under the Pennsylvania Constitution than under the Con-
stitution of the United States, the interpretation of the confrontation and
compulsory process clauses of the Sixth Amendment, and of the due process
clause as well, by the United States Supreme Court in Pennsylvania v
Ritchie should provide the framework for decision under our Constitution. 6
Rather than providing a rationale to justify more expansive dis-
covery, the Kennedy decision, in essence, baits the hook for the
defendant's "fishing expeditions" into the victim's history with
Child Protective Service agencies. The balancing of victim's confi-
94. See note 14.
95. Construction of Statutes, 1 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1921 (Purdon 1992 Supp).
§ 1921. Legislative intent controls:
(a) The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate
the intention of the General Assembly. Every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give
effect to all its provisions.
(b) When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not
to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.
(c) When the words of the statute are not explicit, the intention of the General Assembly
may be ascertained by considering, among other matters:
(1) The occasion and necessity for the statute.
(2) The circumstances under which it was enacted.
(3) The mischief to be remedied.
(4) The object to be attained.
(5) The former law, if any, including other statutes upon the same or similar subjects.
(6) The consequences of a particular interpretation.
(7) The contemporaneous legislative history.
(8) Legislative and administrative interpretations of such statute.
Pub L 1339, No 290, § 3 (December 6, 1972).
96. Commonwealth v Lloyd, 523 Pa 427, 567 A2d 1357, 1370 (1989) (Larsen, joined
by Papadakos, dissenting). In this case the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that appellant
was entitled to in camera review of hospital records of treatment of a six year old victim of
sexual abuse. Lloyd, 567 A2d at 1360. Lloyd had been convicted of rape, statutory rape and
indecent assault of a six year old child who attended a daycare center where he was em-
ployed. Id at 1357. Justice Larsen wrote an emphatic dissent: "[t]he majority of this Court
now continues the assault upon this young rape victim's personal integrity, assists in further
invasion of her privacy... [t]hus does the criminal 'justice' system become an active accom-
plice in the violation of another rape victim." Id at 1360.
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dentiality with the defendant's right to discovery was found neces-
sary in Ritchie to guard the state's compelling interest in protect-
ing its child abuse information. "Difficulties arise with defense
attorneys' potentially divided loyalties and pro se defendants
whose obligation of confidentiality cannot be assured, or to whom
disclosure would have an adverse effect on the child.
'97
In Oregon, child protective service files are discoverable by
means of in camera inspection by the trial court.98 Although the
confidentiality of the records is not absolute by statute, inspection
of the records by the adverse party is not deemed appropriate.99
Further, the in camera inspection must be conducted by the trial
judge and cannot be delegated to a party or counsel.100
Likewise, in Massachusetts the in camera inspection of confiden-
tial records is used to determine whether possibly privileged infor-
mation should be disclosed.' 0 '
Although the United States Supreme Court in Ritchie held that
the interests of the defendant and of the commonwealth were fully
protected by in camera inspection of Child Protective Service
files, 0 2 the Kennedy court found this too restrictive. One must
question what interests the court is protecting by allowing a full
disclosure of the Child Protective Service record of damage to a
child resulting from her family's failure or inability to properly
care for her.
Child Protective Service agencies could establish a procedure of
maintaining investigation files separate from service files, but the
dual functions of investigation and rehabilitation may not be well
served by that. The Department of Public Welfare which regulates
and monitors the actions of Child Protective Service agencies has
not, as yet, addressed this area of case management.
97. Oregon v Warren, 304 Or 428, 746 P2d 711, 714 (1987). Defendant was convicted
of sexual abuse of a seven year old girl. Warren, 746 P2d at 712. The court of appeals
vacated the judgment and remanded the case for in camera review of CPS records holding
that notes of caseworker's conversations with witnesses regarding events to which they tes-
tify are discoverable. Id. The supreme court affirmed. Id.
98. Id at 714.
99. Id.
100. Oregon v Lewis, 310 Or 541, 800 P2d 786, 788 (1990). The court on motion of the
district attorney issued a writ of mandamus that the judge was without authority to allow
defense counsel to inspect children's services records and that he must conduct an in cam-
era inspection of the records himself outside the presence of the parties to determine
whether they contain information subject to discovery. Lewis, 800 P2d at 787.
101. Commonwealth v Collette, 387 Mass 425, 439 NE2d 1223, 1231 (1982). See also
Commonwealth v Merola, 405 Mass 529, 542 NE2d 249, 256 (1989).
102. See note 71 and accompanying text.
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The Department has, however, joined Philadelphia County in its
petition for allowance of appeal of the Kennedy case, and will file
an amicus brief if allocatur is granted.
CONCLUSION
Looking at Ludwig, Wall, and Kennedy together, it is apparent
that whatever limited protections are, or could be, available to
child victims of sexual abuse in the prosecution of their abusers are
being eroded by the Pennsylvania courts. The courts are thereby
defining such abuse as a family problem rather than a criminal
one, and thus limiting resources to deal with the problem to child
protection laws and juvenile courts.
Children are not miniature adults. They think, talk, act differ-
ently. They are vulnerable and dependent on adults and that is
what enables adults to misuse them. That status is what makes it
so difficult for children to face their offenders in a courtroom full
of adult strangers. That status is what allows adults to question
and re-question their competence and credibility. Children vio-
lated and betrayed by trusted caretakers must find their safety and
protection from the State. That is the state's compelling interest.
Child sexual abuse is both a family problem and a crime. In order
to effectively protect victims of intrafamilial sexual abuse, offend-
ers must be held accountable through the criminal justice system.
The state interest in children must be sufficiently compelling to
allow child victims access to that protection. Unlike their offend-
ers, who expected adult behavior from them, the State must recog-
nize their status and hold them to realistic expectations, even as
regards the criminal courtroom. Courts must do more than voice
concerns for victimized children. Because the child's status is the
reason for the state's compelling interest in protection, courts
should not ignore that status in the protection process.
Somewhere in Pennsylvania, a child is asking for help, and our
courts are not listening.
Barbara Jollie
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